We would like to invite you to participate in Management Engineering (ME) Seminar.

1. When: October 11th (Thursday), 16:00 ~ 17:30
2. Where: Building 9, 7th #9705
3. Speaker: Prof. Ryu, Seokjong (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)
4. Topic: Reputation with Multiple Commitment Types: continuous-time.
5. Research field: Managerial Economics
* Lecture will be delivered in English.
* Seminar materials: Attachment

Abstract:
We study reputation with imperfect monitoring in which a large player faces a continuum of infinitely-lived small players. As did in the literature on reputation effects, we allow a framework in which the support of the prior belief of small players contains any finite number of commitment types. In this setting, we characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, we derive an optimality condition for the equilibrium actions, and we show the existence of an approximate Markov equilibrium. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of the approximate Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to an approximate PDE. Finally, we show that the equilibrium actions of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that depends on the small players' posterior beliefs about commitment types.