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Academic SeminarThe Persuasive and Informative Effects of Information Disclosure: Evidence from an Online Supply Chain Finance Market

  • Date
  • 2018-06-29 ~ 2018-06-29
  • Time
  • 10:00 ~ 17:30
  • Place
  • Supex Building, 5th floor #Chey A
  • Department
  • 경영공학부 행정팀
  • Major
  • IT Management

We would like to invite you to participate in Management Engineering(ME) Seminar.

1. Speaker: Prof. Yong Tan (Foster School of Business, Univ. of Washington)
2. Date: June 29th(Friday)
3. Schedule of seminars

[Seminar] 10:00~12:00 SUPEX Chey A
The Persuasive and Informative Effects of Information Disclosure: Evidence from an Online Supply Chain Finance Market

[TALK] 16:00~17:30 SUPEX Chey A
Recent research trend and research methodology

4. Research field: IT Management

* Lecture will be delivered in English.

Abstract: This paper examines the influence of information disclosure on individuals' behavioral change in a crowdfunded supply chain finance (SCF) market. In contrast to prior work that takes a static view and focuses on investment incidences at the aggregate level, we jointly model the lenders' browsing and funding dynamics at a more granular, individual level. By leveraging an exogenous information-disclosure policy change, we first identify an instant change in lender behaviors around the day of the shock using a Regression Discontinuity Design. We then develop a two-stage decision-making model to structurally uncover how these behaviors are affected by the implemented policy under imperfect information. In the first stage, we estimate its effect on lenders’ browsing propensity using a logit demand estimation model. In the second stage, we model lenders’ investment decisions under a Bayesian learning framework. The proposed model allows us to disentangle the effect of information disclosure from other confounders. Our results show that the popularity statistics of the platform have a persuasive effect on lenders’ browsing behavior. This effect leads to a higher browsing propensity and the magnitude of the effect is accentuated by the level of information accessibility. Our results also demonstrate the evidence of individual learning in guarantors’ true reliability. Disclosing extra information regarding fundraisers’ credit has an informative effect, which accelerates the learning process and helps lenders make sound investment decisions. Finally, we find that an individual’s perception of a guarantor’s reliability has moderating effects on observable loan attributes: when the individual perceives a guarantor to be more reliable, she tends to care less about the interest rate but pays more attention to the loan duration in making her investment decision. Our findings offer important managerial implications for fundraisers and platform designers in the online SCF market.

Contact : Lee, Jisun ( jisunlee@kaist.ac.kr )