We would like to invite you to participate in Management Engineering (ME) Seminar.

1. When: October 22nd (Mon), 16:00 ~ 17:30
2. Where: Building 9, 7th #9705
3. Speaker: Prof. Jeong-Yoo Kim (Kyunghee University)
4. Topic: Best-Response Perfect Equilibrium
5. Research field: Managerial Economics
* Lecture will be delivered in Korean.

Abstract
In noncooperative game theory, it has been a challenging issue to define a point- valued solution concept which is robust to any perturbation in strategies and whose existence is guaranteed. In this paper, we propose several point-valued equilibrium concepts which are almost robust to any arbitrary perturbations in strategies. All of them are based on the approach to approximating the best response correspondence by a sequence of continuous quasi-best-response functions. In particular, the weakly best-response perfect equilibrium (WBRPE), which is our main equilibrium concept, requires the intersection of quasi-best-response functions to have a subsequence to converge to the equilibrium for any sequence of continuous functions which converges uniformly to the best response correspondence on a restricted domain. We prove that WBRPE always exists in any two-person non-trivial game, i.e., game without unilaterally equivalent strategies, by using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.