We would like to invite you to participate in Management Engineering (ME) Seminar.

1. When: November 8th (Thursday), 16:00 ~ 17:30
2. Where: Building 9, 7th #9705
3. Speaker: Daeyoung Jeong, Ph.D. (New York University – Abu Dhabi)
4. Topic: Stable Constitutions
5. Research field: Managerial Economics
* Lecture will be delivered in English.

Abstract:
This study identifies a set of stable constitutions. A constitution is a pair of voting rules (f,F) where f is for the choice of final outcome, and F is for the decision on the change of a voting rule from the given rule f. A constitution is stable if any possible alternative rule does not get enough votes to replace the given rule f under the rule F. We fully characterize the set of interim stable constitutions among anonymous voting rules. We also characterize the properties of the interim stable constitutions among general weighted majority rules.